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ABSTRACT
How can firms in foreign direct investment (FDI) best protect their assets from host government
contract beach? FDI is the largest and most stable form of external financing to less developed
countries (LDCs). It increases job growth, technological development, and efficiency in the host
country, subsequently increasing economic development. Companies prefer to invest in countries
that are less prone to contract breach. I propose that credibility of commitments can help explain
variation in contract breach. I propose that firms are most likely to avoid contract breach when
they are involved in supply chains and when the host country has a preferential trade agreement
(PTA).
I measure this relationship using a difference of means test and logistic regression. Using data
from 1992-2008 from the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), I
find that on average, the least amount of cases filed involved supply chains and PTAs. Only 4%
of cases involved supply chains and PTAs, suggesting a protective force in FDI. The interaction
between supply chains and PTAs has a significantly positive effect on investors winning their
cases in the ICSID. My results suggest that in the event of a contract breach, my interaction
variable of membership in supply chains and PTA’s help investors protect their assets.
The implications of these findings are twofold. To safeguard their FDI, firms can ensure better
protection from contract breach through supply chains. Furthermore, host countries can attract
more FDI from PTAs. For future research, I suggest case study analysis as well as interviews
with representatives from foreign firms that have dealt with contract breach.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is crucial to the growth of less developed countries
(LDCs). FDI is defined as the flow of private capital from a firm to a location residing outside
the sovereign borders of its respective home country. A home country is simply the country from
which a firm operates (Jensen, 2003). Among other options of external financing to LDCs, FDI
has been the most abundant and robust in the wake of economic shocks over past ten years.
Figure 1 illustrates how stable this source of income is for LDCs as compared to other forms of
external financing. Of the five major sources of income to LDCs (including remittances,
portfolio investment, bank loans, and official development assistance), FDI has been the largest
and most stable. Bank loans have been the most turbulent, skyrocketing to nearly $800 billion in
2006 and falling almost zero two years later. Portfolio investments have also been turbulent
while never reaching the same amount as remittances (UNCTAD, 2018). Remittances and
official developmental assistance have also been stable, but significantly less than FDI over time,
as depicted in Figure 1. However, multinational corporations (MNCs) are at becoming
increasingly disillusioned at investing in LDCs as they fear breach of contract on the part of the
host country. Caseloads of contract breach in international investment courts increase each year
(ICSID, 2018). Breach of contract in FDI involves either party in an agreement reneging on their
promises, in FDI this oftentimes means investors lose money consequently. Finding a means for
investors to be more certain in their investments, then, is crucial for the future growth of FDI and
by proxy development.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
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The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World
Investment Report has assessed that FDI constitutes 24% of LDC’s external financing in 2017.
Since 2008, it has surpassed all other forms including remittances, portfolio investment, bank
loans, and official development assistance (UNCTAD, 2018). LDCs have good reason to adopt
policies to attract FDI. It increases job growth, technological development, and efficiency in the
host country (Jensen, 2003).
Consequently, host countries, or countries experiencing the inflow of FDI, must
successfully and continually attract FDI to propel economic development, all else equal. MNCs
participating in FDI desire to avoid political risk, which is a viable concern in LDCs. Risks
involved in LDCs include working with new or unstable regimes with little transparency and/or
formality in the policymaking process. This results in uncertainty of future actions on the part of
the host country, something an MNC desires to avoid (Jenson, 2008). Risks include breach of
contract to outright expropriation of assets of an MNC (Johns and Wellhausen, 2016). When a
host country reneges on a commitment, the affected MNC may litigate through international
investment settlement dispute courts. The most relevant court is the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), operated through the World Bank, which
administered 279 cases in 2018 alone (ICSID, 2018). If MNCs fear a host government may
breach their contract, they will be less inclined to invest. This is particularly troublesome for
LDCs that depend on FDI so heavily for external financing. The credibility of commitments host
governments make is crucial information for MNCs assessing investment prospects (Allee and
Peinhardt, 2011).
Firms makes choices about foreign direct investment based on the ownership, location,
and internalization (OLI) framework. Ownership refers to advantages a firm may have based on
2

a specific product, process, or brand recognition. Location deals with the variation of production
or transportation costs related to a product or policies such as tariffs. Natural resources and the
cost of labor also have to do with location. Finally, firms make choices in FDI based on
internalization; it is the choice firms make to retain their ownership over their products and
processes rather than selling patents and simply trading with other firms in different locations
(Jensen, 2003; Dunning, 2001). They also make decisions based on the past actions of host
governments. Commitments LDCs make in the form of trade agreements signal to potential
investors how they may be treated in FDI. Trade agreements, especially involving multiple
parties with clauses for dispute settlement mechanisms, increase the inflow of FDI to signatory
countries (Büthe and Milner, 2014). Type of governance, or level of democratic development, is
also a determining factor for firms’ choices in investment. Countries with democratic regimes
have lower levels of political risk as their executives are constrained by other branches of
government and public opinion (Jensen, 2008).
Despite varying levels of host country development, not all firms are susceptible to the
same level of political risk. Johns and Wellhausen (2016) find that firms engaged in FDI that are
members of supply chains are better protected against government breach of contract than firms
acting alone. Here, supply chains refer to the practice of business between firms that specialize at
different stages of production of a good. These protections supply chains enjoy promote MNC’s
preferences for open trade (Meckling and Huges, 2017). Scholars in the field look at FDI from
either the point of view of the host government or the firm. They ask how governments can
attract more FDI or how firms can avoid contract breach. Both perspectives contribute to
discerning what increases FDI. FDI is salient to the overall economic growth and development of
LDCs.
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One way to assess the growth of FDI is to analyze how firms can best protect themselves
against government contract breach. When an MNC is confident that its assets will not be in
jeopardy, it is free to invest where it pleases, within the realms of the OLI paradigm. How then,
are firms best protected against government contract breach? Wellhausen (2015) poses that firms
are better protected in host governments that have little diversity of the nationality of other
investors. It follows that host governments with high levels of national diversity of investors
have the power to treat firms’ contracts differently and retain FDI inflow from other national
investors. Host governments with low levels of nationality diversity of investors, on the other
hand, do not have this luxury.
Knowing that trade agreements, level of democratic development, and supply chains all
increase FDI, how are firms to protect themselves in host governments with high levels of
investor diversity? Assuming that diversity increases with the inflow of FDI, this problem will
only become more prevalent. Even firms protected in supply chains are vulnerable to contract
breach. To illustrate, MAKAE Europe SARL, a French fashion retail firm, currently has as a
case pending with Saudi Arabia for “allegedly systematic and unwarranted harassment by the
Government that led to the alleged destruction of the claimant’s fashion retail business in the
country” (UNCTAD, 2017). As a fashion retail firm, MAKAE is a member of a supply chain as
it sources its garments from textile suppliers in China. MAKAE filed against Saudi Arabia on the
grounds of a French-Saudi Arabian bilateral investment treaty (BIT) signed in 2002 (UNCTAD,
2017). Despite membership in a supply chain and the protection under a trade agreement, this
particular firm was affected by contract breach and chose to litigate Saudi Arabia through the
ICSID.

4

Existing FDI literature and trends fail to explain the discrepancy in commitment
credibility of host countries despite variance in supply chain and trade agreement membership.
Host countries will not decrease nationality diversity of investors as globalization continues to
transform the international economy. If firms were to have more information on how to best
protect their assets, they would take part in more FDI and consequently LDCs would have their
best chance at development.
I offer a new approach at looking at the relationship between host countries and investors:
the interaction of host country specific and firm specific factors. I find that when firms are part of
a supply chains and the host country is a member of a trade agreement, firms are best protected
against contract breach. An investor’s membership in a supply chain imposes firm level
credibility pressures on the host government; furthermore, a host government’s membership in
an international trade agreement imposes state level pressures not to break a contract. Pressures
from the firm level include litigation and divestment from members in the supply chain. When a
host country is sued in international courts like the ICSID, other firms are also dissuaded from
investment for fear of future contract breach. On the state level, host countries involved in trade
agreements that breach contracts lose credibility in their commitments.
Currently, literature analyzing FDI fails to recognize the effects that the interaction
between supply chains and trade agreements have on contract breach. Quantitatively assessing
the relationship between contract breach and the interaction between supply chains and trade
agreements offers a few challenges. To date, there is no database of the universe of firms
involved in FDI, supply chains, or breach of contract. The best way to study variation of contract
breach involves using data from international court cases. I asses the descriptive statistics of
cases filed through the ICSID that involve supply chains, trade agreements, and the interaction
5

between the two. I find that the least frequent category of cases filed involve firms in a supply
chain with a trade agreement. While cases filed through the ICSID may denote breach of
contract, this source does not account for all the events in which a host government has broken a
contract and a firm has not retaliated through an international court. Consequently, I have an
inherent selection bias when attempting to study the variation in host government contract
breach, signaling that my results provide a conservative estimate.
I take a step further and propose that firms involved in supply chains and trade
agreements are best at protecting their assets in the event of a contract breach. Assessing which
variables are effective in determining when an investor wins an investor-state dispute, I find the
interaction between supply chains and trade agreements to be significant. More specifically, I
find that preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are more effective than bilateral trade agreements
(BITs). The consequences of reneging on a commitment between several countries are greater
than one. All other individual factors are insignificant in the event of a contract breach.
Chapter One provides an overview of the significance of FDI and introduction to the
question of how firms can best protect their assets from contract breach. Chapter Two introduces
literature from FDI, including what scholars know about the nature of host governments, the
nature of firms, and how they affect the inflow of FDI. I then describe the possible implications
selection bias when studying trade agreements. Chapter Three illustrates my theoretical
reasoning for how the interaction between supply chains and PTA’s is significant in a firm’s
ability to protect their assets. Chapter Four describes my models and methods used to test this
claim. I employ several mean comparison analyses to assess the prevalence of my interaction
variables in ICSID cases. I also run probit models using the winner of an investment dispute
(either the investor or the host government) as a dependent variable. Chapter Five relays results,
6

analyses, and limitations in my models. Finally, Chapter Six concludes with my findings, their
implications, and suggestions for future research.
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Figure 1. Sources of external finance, developing economies, 2005-2017 (Billions of dollars)
Source: Reprinted with permission from UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2018
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CHAPTER TWO: PROTECTION AGAINST BREACH OF
CONTRACT

Host governments are inclined to break contracts for several reasons. The benefits of
contract breach for a host government can be short term while the consequences are long term.
Breaking a contract offers a quick, robust source of income to the host government. Depending
on economic and political conditions, host governments abuse foreign investors for capital
inflow and corruption. Developing countries are more often than not susceptible to the conditions
in which this type of corruption occurs and therefore are most risky for FDI (Pinto and Zhu,
2008). In turn, to increase FDI at large, investors must find a way to protect themselves as best
they can.
Trade Agreements
Trade agreements protect firms from the consequences of breach of contract. Trade
agreements deal with several decision makers (including governments and investors) that
negotiate and make concessions to write the rules of trade. The academic consensus is that
international trade agreements promote FDI, especially in less developed countries (LDCs)
(Büthe and Milner, 2008; Jensen, 2008). As the most prevalent types of trade agreements,
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) offer a
framework for credible commitment. PTAs and BITs provide more credibility on the part of the
host government to the investors as their promises are made public and available for use in a
litigation process. A BIT is a written commitment between a host country and a home country
restricting certain actions in international trade exclusive to the two signatories (Milner, 2014).
9

PTAs, on the other hand, are written agreements on trade involving several countries. PTAs
usually involve several countries with specific conditions for trade that are more far reaching
than multilateral trade agreements such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Büthe and
Milner, 2008).
When a host government reneges on a commitment set forth in a trade agreement, there
are international consequences. Trade agreements offer firms the protection through deterrence
and the ability to invoke the agreement in a formal investment dispute settlement process (Büthe
and Milner, 2014). A foreign firm conducting business with a host government without an
international trade agreement lacks an international foot to stand on in defense of its investments.
When governments breach their contracts, foreign firms can sue the government through
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICDSID), operated through the
World Bank. Disregarding how the case is handled, the costs alone of being sued are high.
Without a PTA or a BIT, investors will refrain from making new or continuing investment with
the sued host government (Büthe and Milner, 2014). PTAs and BITs offer firms solid ground to
sue governments when contracts are broken. Although their effectiveness has been contended,
some scholars pose that PTAs are most successful in attracting FDI when they are enacted, strict,
and have dispute settlement mechanisms. The impact of reputational costs at the hand of a BIT
remain limited while PTAs involve more actors (Milner, 2014). The consequences of reneging
on a PTA include other states while a BIT is merely between the home state of a firm and the
host government. As more actors are involved, PTAs have stronger consequences when it comes
to international reputation than BIT’s. Consequently, PTAs are more successful at attracting FDI
than BITs (Büthe and Milner, 2014).
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When a foreign firm enters a market with credible commitment, there is less fear of the
host government breaking their contracts and firms feel more incentive to enter a new
international market when credible commitments are put in place. Furthermore, they are more
reliable to foreign firms than a host government’s domestic policy since the international
consequences of a contract breach for a host government are far greater when a trade agreement
is involved than simply domestic measures (Büthe and Milner, 2008). Being taken to the ICSID
will have economic and credibility related consequences for a host government that are
significantly costly. When no trade agreement is put in place, the firm essentially operates at the
mercy of the host governments and has minimal options for retaliation of contract breach.
When trade agreements cannot provide specific measures of credible commitments,
MNCs are exposed to more political risks. Undemocratic LDCs with less diversified economies
use FDI for corruption more so than any other type of host country (Pinto and Zhu, 2008). In
these situations, firms are more susceptible to contract breach in the wake of corruption. Trade
agreements not only protect firms in FDI, but they also deter factors that hinder political
development at large, such as corruption (Pinto and Zhu, 2008).

Compliance and Selection Bias
Trade agreements lay forth the conditions for how firms and states should act in FDI.
They also inform those involved of the consequences of breaking an agreement. I assess how
successful firms involved in supply chains and PTAs are at preventing host government breach
of contract and subsequently how successful they are at protecting their assets in the event of a
contract breach.
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Dealing with compliance poses some theoretical challenges. Scholars argue that the study
of compliance with contractual agreements is vulnerable to selection biases. The main concern is
that cooperation with trade agreements speaks little to the effectiveness of an agreement and
more to the negotiating process. They contend that states sign treaties that enforces regulations
that do not depart too far from their intended behavior (Downs et all, 1996). It follows that
compliance with treaties is not the result of the threat of punishment, but the result of an ex ante
bargaining process where states make agreements to continue behavior they would have
displayed otherwise. Cooperation, then, is not a rarity attributed to the threat of punishment, but
a rather managerial process. In other words, states only agree to do what they would have already
been doing otherwise (Downs et all, 1996). They cite the abundance of compliance in trade
agreements as a managerial feat rather than cooperation. This theory of compliance challenges
much of FDI literature that praises the effectiveness of trade agreements and international courts.
Nevertheless, FDI scholars argue that reputation and the credibility of commitments to be the
primary catalyst for compliance; adherence to these promises rather than just agreement builds a
state’s reputation (Jensen, 2017). Furthermore, if states agree to terms that they do not intend on
breaking, then there would be no purpose for the ICSID.
Büthe and Milner disagree with this theory of compliance. They counter that if
international agreements were a result of compliance with policies states would have already
enacted, then states’ domestic policy must have already been pursuing liberal international trade
policies to sign these agreements. Investors, then, make decisions relating to a given host
country’s domestic policies rather than membership in trade agreements. In this way, any effect
trade agreements have on investor’s decisions is spurious to a given host country’s domestic
policy (Büthe and Milner, 2008). Büthe and Milner test the effects of economically liberal
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domestic policies by controlling for such policies while looking at the relationship between trade
agreement membership and FDI. In three different models measuring favorable economic
policies for trade (including trade openness, financial openness, and a good policy index) they
find that trade agreements maintain (and in one case strengthens) its significance in increasing
FDI (Büthe and Milner, 2008).
While scholars in the FDI literature note the significance of trade agreements like PTAs
and BITs for establishing credible commitments, the consensus is leaning towards PTAs being
more efficient than BITs. This is due to the greater consequences involved in reneging on a
commitment made to several actors rather than just one. Supply chains have deterrent effects on
two counts. First, breaking a contract with one member of a supply chain invokes losses with all
members of the change. These consequences are not only financially costly but also affect the
host government’s reputation in FDI moving forward. MNCs looking for prospective host
countries will consider a host country’s history of contract breach through open source
information1 (Holburn and Zelner, 2010). Second, any member of a supply chain can retaliate
against a host government in the event of a breach of contract through arbitration. The ICSID is
the most popular of international investment settlement dispute courts that publicly shares the
proceedings of each case. These consequences are slightly more costly if the firm wins as the
host government must pay an award; reputational costs increase as well as MNCs take into
consideration the winners of these court cases (Büthe and Milner, 2014; Holburn and Zelner,
2010; Johns and Wellhausen, 2016).

1

Sources of open source information include data from the World Bank (specifically the ICSID case
database), the UNCTAD, and international business journals (Allee and Peindhardt, 2011).
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When it comes to signaling commitments, formal agreements are more significant than
gestures (Fuhrmann and Sechser, 2014). In FDI, this means that formal contracts like PTAs
should be more successful in preventing contract breach than the material amount of investment.
Consequently, firms do not need to expend much energy to signal their commitments. Simply
being a part of a supply chain with a PTA and functioning cooperatively should be enough to act
as a committed deterrent ally against a hostile host government. Foreign firms in supply chains
with PTAs in risky host governments offset the threat of contract breach.
Nature of Firms
While trade agreements play an important role in the protection against contract breach,
firm specific traits are also imperative. The nationality of the firm in FDI determines the degree
to which a host government will respect its commitments. The type of product a firm produces
also has a significant influence in its ability to protect its assets in risky host governments.
Nationality affects breach of contract in FDI on the side of the firm and the host
government. Conational MNCs, or MNCs with the same home country investing in the same
host country, are more resilient to contract breach than other firms. Conational firms rely on each
other’s legal expertise and shared bilateral relations with the host government. When a host
government has inflow of FDI from many conational firms, the costs of contract breach increase
as issues ensue with every firm connected through bilateral relations with the home country
(Wellhausen, 2015). Conational MNCs enjoy lower transaction costs than other firms as well as
more credible commitments from host governments (Holburn and Zelner 2010). Consequently,
firms sharing home country nationality enjoy better protections against contract breach than
firms investing in countries with high nationality diversity of investors.
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Mergers and acquisitions of MNCs can give a firm multiple home country nationalities,
therefore granting more opportunity for protection (Wellhausen, 2015). Conversely, host
countries receiving inflow of FDI from individual MNCs of varying nationalities enjoy more
power to expropriate firms. When the individual firms investing in a host country are of varying
nationalities, the host country can pick and choose to breach contracts with firms of individual
nationalities while retaining access to the benefits from firms of other nationalities. Essentially, a
host country can “trade-off one nationality’s contract sanctity against other sources of current
and future FDI” (Wellhausen, 2015).
The good that a firm produces has a twofold effect on protection against contract breach.
Products in FDI determine whether a firm undergoes the consequences of the obsolescing
bargain or the benefits of being a member of a supply chain. The obsolescing bargain refers to
the negotiation process in situations where firms in specific industries are worse off ex post than
ex ante. It follows that firms that conduct business industries with heavy initial investments (and
therefore a more costly exit process), such as extraction of natural resources and infrastructure,
have less power after contracts have been made with a host government in FDI (Wellhausen,
2015; Frieden, 1994). The obsolescing bargain situation allows host governments to take
advantage of this costly exit process where the costs to a firm from contract breach can be less
than exiting FDI entirely. Therefore, firms engaged in industries with high initial investments are
more vulnerable to contract breach in FDI than others (Wellhausen, 2015).
Another way the type of good a firm produces determines its protection against contract
breach pertains to membership in a supply chain. A supply chain is a network of firms that
conducts business to produce a finished good. Each firm in the chain deals with the good at some
intermediate level (Baccini et al, 2008). In FDI, host government contract breach with one link
15

affects the whole chain. Supply chains can act like a defense against contract breach as reneging
on commitments to one firm affects them all and incurs greater losses for all parties, host
governments included (Johns and Wellhausen, 2016). When a host government decides to breach
a contract with one firm on the global supply chain, it inadvertently breaches the contract of
every firm involved in each stage of the product. The losses involved with losing business with
the whole chain is far greater than the losses involved with one firm and is a strong deterrent to
contract breach in international trade (Johns and Wellhausen, 2016). Consequently,
interdependence between firms creates greater consequences for government breach of contract.
Firms at each stage of production benefit from a global market more so than a merely domestic
one (Meckling and Hughes, 2017). Of course, participation is limited to firms that produce
intermediate goods. However, involvement in supply chains allows foreign firms to deter
contract breach (Johns and Wellhausen, 2016). Thus, foreign firms engaged in global supply
chains protect each other and their own investments.
Thus, FDI literature establishes several conditions for protection against breach of
contract: participation in trade agreements (more specifically, PTAs), shared nationality between
a firm’s home country and host country, diversity of nationalities in inflow of FDI in a host
country, industry type, and membership in a supply chain. Better protection against contract
breach will promote FDI and inadvertently economic development of LDCs. How then, are firms
to best protect their assets when the ICSID continues to receive more cases each year?
Previous authors in the field have identified various significant causal variables to a
firm’s ability to protect their assets in FDI. However, they fail to identify how cases such as
MAKAE v Saudi Arabia end up in the ICSID when MAKAE is a member of a supply chain, has
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a BIT with Saudi Arabia, and is in an industry that does not involve the obsolescing bargain. I
find that ideas from alliance literature as inspiration to solve this puzzle2.
FDI literature has not yet studied the interaction between trade agreements and supply
chains. However, I pose that looking at how these variables affect contract breach can offer some
predictive and explanatory power.

2
Benson in 2011 conducted a study to determine which types of alliances are best at preventing militarized
interstate dispute (MID). Creating a typology of alliance that evaluates whether an alliance is deterrent or compellent
and whether an alliance is conditional or not, he finds that conditional deterrent alliances are best at preventing MID
(Benson, 2011). In this case, the interaction between these two variables are significant. I take inspiration by looking
at the interaction between deterrent and conditional concepts.
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CHAPTER THREE: A THEORY OF CONTRACT BREACH

There are several explanations for host government behavior in FDI. Some theorists pose
that trade agreements are significant when it comes to contract breach as they bind host
governments to public commitments. Others contend that the type of industry itself that
determines how a firm is treated (i.e. the obsolescing bargain). Furthermore, there are
explanations as to which types of trade agreements are more effective than others (for example,
Milner (2014) claims that PTA’s are more effective than BIT’s). Meanwhile, other scholars in
the field contend that international commitments may not matter to some governments. A state
may perform a cost benefit analysis and realize that the gains from breaking a contract with a
foreign firm outweighs the consequences laid out in the trade agreement. Consequences are
monetary and reputational: a firm can merely devest or decide to litigate the host government
through an international investment dispute court. In this sense, there are certain situations where
foreign firms may be more susceptible to contract breach than others.
The global supply chain theory helps explain which situations firms might be more
protected in risky FDI. The protective nature of supply chains provides a better explanation of
the growth of FDI than other factors such as regime type or industry type. Host governments are
more reluctant to break a contract with a foreign firm in a supply chain for the fear of the losses
spurred from breaking a contract with the whole chain. When a host government breaks a
contract from a single operating foreign firm, whatever losses accrue (from withdrawal of
investment to litigation) are usually from the single firm alone. However, when a contract is
broken with a firm in a supply chain, those losses can be multiplied by other actors in the supply
chain. Therefore, it is costlier to break a contract with a firm in a supply chain than one that
18

operates alone. This invokes a deterrent effect as a rational host government would not desire to
exponentiate their losses.
Host countries continue to break contracts with MNCs involved in supply chains, have
trade agreements, or even mixtures of the two. Evaluating the interaction between the variables
will help fill this gap.

Theory
Supply chains not only dependent on business from the host country, but business from
each other (Johns and Wellhausen, 2016). Their economic relationships in risky host countries
deter contract breach via threats of economic losses and multiple arbitrations in international
courts. The deterrent threat involved in FDI has to do with suing a host country for breach of
contract. If a host country breaches a contract with a foreign firm, said firm can sue the host
government through the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
The ICSID was created through Article 6 of the ICSID Convention Treaty that was
ratified in 1966. Article 6 establishes requirements for an Administrative Council to create and
enforce rules for arbitration and conciliation in international investment disputes. As an entity, it
was created to “remove major impediments to the free international flows of private investment
posed by non-commercial risks and the absence of specialized international methods for
investment dispute settlement” (ICSID, 2012). The inaugural Administrative Council Chairman
of the ICSID was also the President of the World Bank at the time, George Woods. The first
meeting of the ICSID was held in February of 1967, where the Secretary-General was elected
and provisional rules were discussed (Parra, 2012). The involvement of the World Bank with the
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ICSID in its origins was designed to be limited. Delegates of the meeting discussed the role of
the World Bank and came to the conclusion that the World Bank would “never be a part to
proceedings under the ICSID Convention; nor would the Secretary-General, an administrative
officer, have responsibility for the settlement of disputes” (Parra, 2012).
The first annual meeting of the ICSID was attended by most of its contracting states. The
Chairman expressed his satisfaction that the ICSID has already become an entity that investors
and states alike can trust to settle their disputes. He also noted that countries that have not yet
signed would benefit greatly by an increase in investors (Parra, 2012). The Secretary General
discussed a trend in increase in legislation promoting foreign investment after signing as a
member of the ICSID. He also hinted that membership in the ICSID itself could one day replace
the role of BITs (Parra, 2012).
By 1970, Italy, Belgium, and the UK had enacted several BITs using clauses referencing
the ICSID for dispute settlement. The ICSID gained international notoriety for its role in dispute
settlements and jurisdiction over an influx of investment contracts in its first two decades. In
these years, the majority of cases dealt with industry and trade; energy and mining; and
agriculture, fishing, and foster. The average length of a case at this time was a little less than
three years (Parra, 2012). It has been important to the ICSID since its creation to render public as
much information as they can about their casework. Their rigorous data entry and publication is
the reason I am able to conduct my research today. Transparency in casework and outcomes also
reinforces the accountability and credibility the institution has today in investment dispute
settlement.
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Accordingly, foreign firms in supply chains can deter host governments from breaking a
contract by threat of litigation. Litigation is costly for a government fiscally and reputationally. If
a government has been sued for contact breach, it becomes a less attractive prospect for further
investment to other foreign firms (Büthe and Milner, 2014). This is especially costly to LDCs
that depend on FDI for stable economic growth. Supply chains, therefore, play a strategic role in
FDI. While MNCs certainly do not always see host governments as adversaries, they desire some
protections when dealing with host governments with reputations for breach of contract. I argue
that MNCs with membership in supply chains and trade agreements have a special, advantageous
position in FDI.
PTAs refer to an agreement made between several states that specify how they will act in
international trade. Provisions in these agreements describe how a firm is to act in the case of a
contract breach and includes reputational costs to all parties involved. BITs are agreements
between a foreign firm’s home state and a host government that provide specific conditions as to
how the firm shall be treated (Büthe and Milner, 2008). Trade agreements are the conditionality
factor that lay out certain details of how states and firms will interact. PTAs are more effective
than BITs as the costs are greater to the arbitrator in the case of a contract breach. PTAs have
more severe international reputational costs as more actors are involved while the consequences
from breaking BITs remain bilateral (Milner, 2014). I propose that MNCs involved in supply
chains and trade agreements should be best suited to deter host government contract breach:
H1: Host governments are less likely to break a contract with foreign firms involved in
PTAs and supply chains than firms involved in just PTAs, just supply chains, or neither.
All firms have the capability to arbitrate a host government in the event of breach of
contract. However, the outcome of an investor-state dispute is not guaranteed to be in the favor
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of either actor. Consequently, the threat of litigation is not enough to sway host governments
from breaking contracts with foreign firms.
Supply chains deter host governments from breaking contracts and the economic and
reputational costs spread to every link in the chain (as opposed to just one in individual
enterprise). Breaking a contract with a firm in a supply chain jeopardizes business with every
firm involved. A contract broken with a firm that produces an intermediate good will inevitably
affect the finished good and all businesses associated. PTAs also increase international
reputational consequences under certain conditions. They specify how firms and host
governments are to behave in FDI and the consequences of breach of contract. Therefore, I
propose that firms in supply chains and trade agreements are not only best suited to prevent
contract breach, but also best suited to protect their assets in the event of a contract breach. The
second hypothesis follows:
H2: In the event of a contract breach, firms that are involved in supply chains and trade
agreements protect their assets more efficiently than those otherwise.
In the following section, I describe how I intend to test these hypotheses. I test my claims
related to the interaction of supply chains and trade agreements using mean comparison analysis
and probit regression. For both hypotheses, I propose that cases with firms involved in supply
chains and trade agreements are significantly less prevent in ICSID cases and more likely to win
the cases they end up in compared to other firms.
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA AND METHODS

The dependent variable in this study pertains to contract breach in foreign direct
investment (FDI). Breach of contract involves illegally changing previously specified terms with
a firm. The most extreme form of contract breach is asset seizure or outright nationalization
(Johns and Wellhausen, 2016). To measure breach of contract, the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) database is used. The ICSID is a function of the
World Bank established in 1966 as an outlet for firms and states to formally air their grievances
(World Bank, 2018). Since its formation, 706 cases have been filed through the ICSID and stored
in their data base that is open to the public. Each case contains detailed information including the
subject of dispute, economic sector, instrument invoked, applicable rules, claimant nationality,
respondent, and date registered (World Bank, 2018). The table below may be used as reference
for the variables used to measure both hypotheses.

Deterring Breach of Contract
My first hypothesis assumes a relationship between the interaction of trade agreements
and supply chains on the likelihood of government contract breach. There are two inherent
empirical challenges: a) there exists no comprehensive list of supply chains and b) there is no
comprehensive list of government breach of contract either. The latter invokes serious validity
issues as it is a challenge to accurately measure the dependent variable: host government contract
breach. Later, I explain how I approach the former issues using theoretical assumptions to
measure supply chains. I also take an additional step to measure the effectiveness of this variable
in protection of assets in the event of a contract breach with my second hypothesis.
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My main explanatory variable is the interaction between PTAs and supply chains. FDI
literature has marked the significance of these variables when it comes to minimizing political
risk for MNCs. However, the effect of the combination of these two variables has never been
considered. I hypothesize that this interaction variable has a negative effect on host government
contract breach. While I cannot perform a full regression test as I do not have a valid measure of
my dependent variable, I can look at the frequencies of cases filed through the ICSID. Using
cases filed through the ICSID from 1987 to present, I assess how many of these cases were filed
by firms involved in trade agreements, supply chains, and the interaction between the two.
Consequently, descriptive statistics for three variables are analyzed: for trade agreements,
supply chains, and the interaction between the two. I use data from ICSID cases spanning from
1987 to present with an n group of 213. The first count will assess the prevalence of trade
agreements in cases. This variable has three values: PTA (coded as 2), BIT (coded as 1), and
neither (coded as 0). I expect PTAs to be far from the mean as they should have a better deterrent
effect than the other values. PTAs involve interactional reputational costs that are far more
severe than a mere BIT. The second analysis looks at the prevalence of supply chains in ICSID
cases; I use a dummy variable coded 1 for supply chain and 0 for otherwise. The exact
theoretical justifications for this coding can be found in the methods section for my regression
testing. While assessing the descriptive statistics for the supply chain variable, I expect the mean
to lean more towards 0 (no supply chain) as host governments should be deterred from the
incremental losses invoked in breaking a link in the chain. I measure the interaction between the
two variables by multiplying the trade agreements variable by the supply chain variable. Values
at 0 represent cases that either do not involve a supply chain or do not involve a trade agreement,
1 represents cases that involve a supply chain and a BIT, and 2 represents cases that involve a
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supply chain and a PTA. I expect the mean to be significantly less than two as supply chains with
PTAs should be the most effective at deterring host government contract breach.

Protecting Assets in the Event of Breach of Contract
In assessing the relationship between host government contract breach and the interaction
of supply chains and trade agreements, a regression analysis can convey more information than
descriptive statistics. In order to examine this relationship in a more robust manner, I employ a
different dependent variable: the event of a firm winning an investor state dispute. The ICSID
database provides information on the winner of these cases. Either the state wins, the investor
wins, there is a settlement of sorts, or the case is still pending. Cases where the investor wins
measure the effectives of a firm to protect their assets from a host government’s breach of
contract. Cases where the state wins measure the inability of a firm to protect their assets. When
an investor wins a case at the ICSID, the investor has effectively protected their investments in a
formal court weighing contract breach. All other results (settlements and pending cases) are
dropped as they do not measure the effectiveness of a firm to protect their assets and prevent
further losses. I have also dropped cases that fall outside of the time frame of one of my control
variables (specifically, nationality diversity which is limited to measuring 1992-2008).
Consequently, there are a total of 231 observations from 1992-2008. Table 4 in the appendix
displays a list of breaches by host country in my data, descending from highest to lowest.
While the most appropriate dependent variable for this study involves preventing a
breach of contract in the first place, it is nearly impossible to measure. With the data available, I
can assess which factors determine whether a firm protects their assets or not in the event of a
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contract breach. Using the event of a firm winning an investor state dispute determines how well
the protections of trade agreements and supply chains work after they have failed to prevent a
contract breach. Filing a suit through the ICSID gives firms a chance to receive financial awards
(usually to the tune of their losses from a breach of contract) and tarnish the reputation of the
host country. When an investor wins a case through the ICSID, they successfully deter the state
and protect their assets. Filing a case through the ICSID effectively has two results (for the
purposes of this study): either the firm wins and they can successfully protect their assets or the
state wins and further losses for the firm are incurred. Consequently, the dependent variable is
coded 1 for cases where the investor has won and 0 for cases where the state has won. Table 2
displays a breakdown of investors and states winning cases. Of the 231 cases, investors won 108
while states won the other 123.
[Insert Table 2 here]

Investment Dispute Settlement
There is no comprehensive list of supply chains or contract breach, which invokes serious
measurement issues. However, this not does not mean than the interaction between supply chains
and trade agreement cannot be tested. I propose that in the event of a contract breach, firms
involved in supply chains and trade agreements are more effective at protecting assets. In other
words, these firms are most likely to win investor-state dispute cases. However, before testing
this assumption, a sense of how cases are filed must be established.
The ICSID has a specific process for how cases are filed and adjudicated. First, a firm
must file for arbitration (in either English, French, or Spanish) and pay a nonrefundable lodging
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fee of $25,000. The ICSID then screens these requests through the approval of the SecretaryGeneral based on the requirements specified in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, Regulation,
and Rules (ICSID, 2019). When the Secretary-General deems a case worthy of registration, the
parties involved (the investor and state) have 60 days to appoint four members to a tribunal for a
preliminary session. Each member of the tribunal must a) have a different nationality than the
party involved and b) “have a moral character and recognized competence in the fields of law,
commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise independent judgement”
(ICSID, 2019). During the first session, a written and oral procedure are performed where the
“jurisdiction, merits or damages may be heard separately or jointly” (ICSID, 2019). A
deliberation follows where the tribunal makes a decision as to who the award goes to (the state or
the investor). All decisions are made by a majority vote and are final with no appeal process
afterwards (ICSID, 2019).

Explanatory Variables
The variation in ICSID case outcomes will be explained by three main variables: supply
chains, trade agreements, and the interaction between the two. These variables are measured
based on information provided from the ICSID. The interaction between the supply chain and the
trade agreement variable will test the resilience of my hypothesis: firms in FDI are more likely to
protect their assets in the case of a contract breach if they have both a trade agreement and
membership in a supply chain. A list of all variables including description and data sources can
be found in Table 1 at the end of this section.
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Supply Chains The prevalence of supply chains is a difficult variable to quantify (see
limitations section). In the best of all possible scenarios, an exhaustive list of all supply chains
from 1992-2008 would be used to cross check if each individual firm is a member of one.
Unfortunately, that does not exist. Consequently, coding supply chains for the purposes of this
project must depend on its definition and information available. A firm’s membership in a supply
chain is derived from the production of an intermediate good. For example, producing
components of an automobile requires trade with other firms to create a finished vehicle.
Cooperating with other firms to make a finished product or even components is the definition of
a supply chain (Johns and Wellhausen, 2016). Therefore, supply chain has been coded using a
firm’s investment type (provided from the ICSID). If a firm’s investment deals with an
intermediate (non-state sponsored) good (including the firms that deal with the finished good), it
is coded 1 for supply chain. All other types of investments have been coded 0. From the 231
observations, 116 have been coded as a supply chain. The remaining 115 cases do not represent
supply chains. Consequently, the dispersion of this variable is almost even between supply
chains and otherwise (at 50.22% and 49.78% respectively). Regardless, I expect supply chains to
have a positive correlation with investors winning cases.
Trade Agreements Trade agreements account for the conditions host governments agree
to comply with in FDI. The ICSID provides information on instruments invoked, which refers to
the legal ground on which the firm has filed a case against the host government. The cases in the
ICSID have either had bilateral investment treaties (BIT’s), preferential trade agreements
(PTA’s,) specific contracts with the governments, or employment of the host government’s
investment law. The FDI literature provides that PTA’s and BIT’s are most effective at
preventing losses on the part of a firm due to international reputation and credibility.
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Consequently, both PTA’s and BIT’s will be coded as individual dummy variables to test which
is more apt at preventing losses. For the PTA variable, cases where a PTA has been invoked are
coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. For the BIT variable, cases where a BIT has been invoked are coded
as 1 and 0 otherwise. Out of the 231 observations, PTAs have been invoked 49 times and BIT’s
140. These represent 21.21% and 60.61% respectively. BIT’s, therefore, represent more cases in
the ICSID database than PTA’s. This could be a testament to their effectiveness or lack thereof. I
expect both variables to have a positive correlation with investors winning cases. However, I do
not expect their effects to be identical. PTAs have been proven to have a stronger relationship
with the growth of FDI than BITs. Consequently, I expect PTAs to have a strong effect on the
dependent variable than BITs as the reputational costs associated with the former are higher.
Interaction I predict that firms are most effective at preventing losses when they are part
of a supply chain and have certain conditions. Consequently, measurement on this variable
requires an interaction variable between the supply chain variable and each trade agreement
variable (BIT and PTA). I will use two interaction variables: one for the interaction between
supply chain and PTA and another for the interaction between supply chain and BIT. The PTA
interaction variable represents 30 cases in the ICSID database, or 12.99%. The BIT interaction
variable represents 69 cases in the database, or 29.87%. Once again, cases involving BIT’s are
more prevalent than PTA’s in my sample of ICSID cases.
I expect both variables (the BIT-supply chain interaction and the PTA-supply chain
interaction) to have a positive correlation with investors winning cases. However, I expect the
PTA interaction variable to be stronger than the BIT variable for the same reason as the
individual variable relationships. There are a total of 30 observations where firms have been both
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a member of a supply chain and have invoked a PTA. There are 69 observations where firms
have been both a member of a supply chain and have invoked a BIT.
[Insert Table 1 here]

Controls
To test the resilience of this model, I include control variables from FDI literature.
Theorists conclude that the national diversity of investments, obsolescing bargain, and
developmental factors all affect the ability of firms to protect their investments.
Nationality Host countries are less likely to breach a contract with a firm when there is
little diversity of nationalities in the inflow of FDI (Wellhausen, 2015). To measure nationality, I
employ a variable from a dataset created by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) (Woodward, 2009). It measures the national diversity of FDI per country
per year on a scale ranging from 1 to 10.6. The central tendency of nationality diversity of
investment for host countries is 4.59 in this dataset. The histogram in Figure 2 illustrates the
dispersion of this variable across ICSID cases. Half the cases deal with diversity less than 4.59,
showing a slight positive skew. I expect a negative relationship between nationality diversity and
the dependent variable.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Obsolescing Bargain The relationship between industry type and contract breach is
explained through the obsolescing bargain: certain agreements can become obsolete after the
firm has made their investment, most often due to high initial costs (Jensen, 2008). For example,
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oil firms may be able to form favorable contracts with governments ad priori. Due to the sheer
cost of equipment, the losses of backing out of an investment can be larger than the losses from
host government contract breach. Consequently, ex ante, the agreements have become obsolete.
Industry type information provided by the ICSID is used to determine which cases involve an
obsolescing bargain.
The more expensive the initial investment, the more incentivized the government is to
breach the contract through the obsolescing bargain. Firms involved in agriculture, electric
power, mining, oil and gas, real estate, and waste management have been coded 1 for having an
obsolescing bargain (Wellhausen, 2015). All other investment types have been coded 0. In my
sample of ICSID cases, 97 deal with the obsolescing bargain while the remaining 134 do not.
Consequently, 41.99% of cases brought to the ICSID deal with firms that have high initial
investment costs. I expect to see a negative relationship between obsolescing bargain and the
dependent variable. While the literature identifies this relationship, I expect my interaction
variable to have a stronger effect on the dependent variable.
Developmental indicators such as GDP, percent of GDP made of FDI, and democracy
have been added as controls as well. FDI literature indicates that firms investing in less
developed countries are more prone to contract breach on the part of the host country (Jensen,
2008). Consequently, these three variables have been included to add robustness to the models.
GDP This variable is measured using the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
dataset (World Bank, 2018). This interval variable is adjusted to represent billions of US dollars
to its current value. The mean GDP from 1992 to 2008 is 743,210 million US Dollars. Firms
should be more likely to protect their assets from more developed economies. Figure 3 illustrates
that the majority of cases brought to the ICSID involve host countries with lower GDPs ie less
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developed countries. Determining how investors can best protect their assets is crucial to
continue future investments in these risky countries, fostering their development. I expect to see
a positive relationship between GDP and the dependent variable.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
Percent GDP FDI Percent of GDP made of FDI is an indicator of the diversity of a host
government’s economy. This interval variable is also measured using the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators dataset (World Bank, 2018). Host governments that have a larger
portion of their GDP made up of FDI should be less likely to break contracts and incur severe
reputational costs with other foreign firms. Furthermore, firms should be more likely to protect
their assets from governments involved with more FDI. The data from my sample of ICSID
cases shows a mean value of 3.12% of GDP from FDI. The 75th percentile of the dispersion is at
5.95%, heavily skewing the data in a positive direction. The 25th percentile is 1.88% percent,
concentrating the frequency between 2-6%. Consequently, the majority of cases brought to the
ICSID involve host countries where about 2-6% of their GDP is from FDI. Figure 4 depicts this
dispersion in a histogram. I expect a positive relationship with percent GDP made of FDI and the
dependent variable.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
Democracy Some theorists also use level of democracy as a development indicator.
MNCs view democracies to have better transparency in policy and can have a positive effect on
the inflow of FDI. Democracies also have higher stakes in international credibility and
reputations (Jensen, 2008). Therefore, host governments that are more democratic should be less
likely to break contracts with firms in FDI. To measure democracy, Polity IV is employed. This

32

dataset measures democracy on a 10-point scale, those having higher scores have higher levels of
democracy. Those with lower scores lean more towards autocracies (Marshall, et all, 2014).
From my sample of ICSID cases, the mean democracy score is 6.54. Central tendency leans
more towards democratic home countries as the 25th and 75th quartiles fall between 5 and 8,
respectively. Figure 5 illustrates the dispersion of the democracy variable across ICSID cases.
Countries with scores between 6 and 10 tend to represent a high frequency of ICSID cases from
my sample. I expect to see a positive relationship between democracy level and the dependent
variables. Firms should be better able to protect their assets against host governments that rank
higher on the democratic scale rather than autocracies due to more transparent policymaking
processes and more international credibility (Jensen, 2008).
[Insert Figure 6 here]

Model Specification
To asses the first hypothesis, I perform simple tabulate and lincom functions in Stata to
observe the frequency of certain variables and significance of the mean in cases of contract
breach. I look at the variation in trade agreements, supply chains, and the interaction between the
two. While assessing trade agreements, I determine how many cases involved PTAs, BITs, or
neither. For supply chains, I look at whether the case involved a supply chain or not using the
theoretical coding described in the previous section for the second hypothesis. Finally, for the
interaction assessment, I analyze how many cases are filed by firms that are a) not part of a
supply chain, b) part of a supply chain and a BIT, or c) part of a supply chain and a PTA.
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To test the second hypothesis, I employ a probit model as the dependent variable is
binary and event driven. There are four models that test the effects the independent variables
discussed above have on the outcome of an investor-state dispute. My interaction variable
accounts for membership in a PTA and a supply chain. I do not employ an interaction variable
with membership in a BIT as it is constituently insignificant and weaker than the PTA interaction
variable across each model. The first model accounts the most basic application of my second
hypothesis:
H2: In the event of a contract breach, firms that are involved in supply chains and trade
agreements protect their assets more efficiently than those otherwise.
Model 1

Y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x1x2 + u
Model 1 tests the relationship between my interaction variable and the event of an
investor winning a case at the ICSID. Y is the outcome of an investor-state dispute. β0 is the
coefficient, or the outcome of an investor-state dispute where all values are 0. X1 represents
supply chains (and β1 is its respective effect on investors winning cases). X2 is the value of
PTA’s while its beta coefficient is its effect on the dependent variable. β3 is the interaction of the
effects of supply chains and PTA’s.

.
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Model 2

Y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x1x2 + β4x4 + β5x5 + u
Model 2 applies control variables for the firm specific conventional wisdom of the
literature. Here, x4 is the amount of nationality diversity in the inflow of foreign direct
investment of a host government. Its corresponding beta coefficient represents its effects on the
outcome of an investor state dispute. Β5x5 accounts for the affect the obsolescing bargain has on
the likelihood of the investor winning the dispute.
Model 3

Y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x1x2 + β6x6+ β7x7 + β8x8+ u
Model 3 tests the effectiveness of my hypothesis using host government specific controls.

Β6x6 represents the GDP in US millions of each host country during its corresponding ICSID
case year and the effects it has on the investor winning. x7 is the percent of the GDP made up of
FDI of each host country during its corresponding ICSID case year. Furthermore, each host
country’s polity score and its effect on the likelihood of an investor winning an ICSID case is
represented by β8x8.
Model 4

Y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x1x2 + β4x4 + β5x5 + β6x6 + β7x7 + β8x8 u
Model 4 tests my second hypothesis using controls from firm and host government
specific assumptions. Here, nationality diversity, the obsolescing bargain, GDP, percent GDP
from FDI, and democracy rating are all represented alongside my interaction variable. I argue
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that the interaction of membership in a supply chain and a PTA will be the strongest, most
significant determinant of an investor winning an ICSID case.
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Table 1. Variables

Variable
Name
Investor Wins

Description

Coding

Source

The even of an investor
winning a case from the ICSID,
either the investor or the state.
Settlements and pending cases
dropped.
Firms involved in supply
chains from ICSID data.

1 = investor wins
0 = state wins

ICSID
database

1 = supply chain
0 = not supply chain

ICSID
database

BIT

ICSID case filed using a BIT as
an instrument invoked.

1 = BIT invoked
0 = no BIT invoked

ICSID
database

PTA

ICSID case filed using a PTA
as an instrument invoked.

1 = PTA invoked
0 = no PTA invoked

ICSID
database

Supply
Chain*PTA

Interaction between supply
chain variable and PTA
variable.
Interaction between supply
chain variable and BIT
variable.
Diversity of firm nationalities
investing in a host country.

1 = supply chain and PTA
0 = all other cases

ICSID
database

1 = supply chain and BIT
0 = all other cases

ICSID
database

Scale from 1-10.6 where 1 is
low diversity and 10.6 is high
diversity.
1 = high initial investment cost
0 = all other cases

OECD

Continuous in millions of
current US dollars

World
Bank

Scale of 0-100 where 0 is 0%
GDP FDI and 100 is 100%
GDP FDI.
0-10 where 0 is complete
autocracy and 10 is most
democratic.

World
Bank

Supply Chain

Supply
Chain*BIT
Nationality
Diversity
Obsolescing
Bargain
GDP US
Millions
% GDP FDI

Democracy

Firms with high initial
investment costs (at the
expense of the firm).
GDP of each host country per
ICSID case year.
Percent GDP of host country
made of FDI per ICSID case
year.
Polity score of host country per
ICSID case year.
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ICSID
database

Polity IV

Table 2. Winner of Cases Dispersion

Winner
Host Country
Investor
Total

Freq.
123
108
231

Percent
53.25
46.75
100

Data Sources: ICSID, 2018

Figure 2. Nationality Diversity Dispersion
Data Sources: ICSID, 2018; OECD, 2009
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Figure 3. GDP Dispersion
Data Sources: ICSID, 2018; World Bank, 2018
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Figure 4. Percent GDP Dispersion
Data Sources: ICSID, 2018; World Bank, 2018
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Figure 5. Democracy Dispersion
Data Sources: ICSID, 2018; Polity IV, 2018
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Deterring Breach of Contract
In exploring the relationship of the first hypothesis, I begin with assessing the frequency
of trade agreements in ICSID cases. Figure 6 illustrates the variation of trade agreements in 513
ICSID cases since 1987. BITs are the most frequent group at a count of 369 (71.93% of cases).
Cases that do not involve BITs or PTAs are the second most frequent at 110, or 21.44%. PTAs
are the least prevalent at 6.63% of cases, or 34 out of 513. The sample mean is 0.85, denoting
that BITs are most prevalent (as they are coded as 1). Testing a sample mean of 2 (denoting
PTAs) against the sample results in a t ratio of -51.07 and a p-value of 0.000. This means that if
the true mean was 2 (signifying PTAs as most prevalent), then a random sample from a
population of ICSID cases would yield the results below 0.000 percent of the time.
Consequently, it is highly unlikely that PTAs would be most prevalent.
[Insert Figure 6 here]
Figure 7 denotes the frequency of ICSID cases involving supply chains. 299 out of 513
cases, or 58.28% of cases involved supply chains as opposed to the 214 that did not. Running a
lincom test to see the probability of the sample mean being zero results in a p-value of 0.000,
denoting that it is highly unlikely that cases not involving supply chains are actually most
prevalent. These findings do not support the assumption that supply chains have a deterrent
effect on host governments from breaking contracts.
[Insert Figure 7 here]
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Figure 8 illustrates the prevalence of the interaction between supply chains and trade
agreements. My first hypothesis proposes that firms in supply chains and PTAs have a deterrent
affect on host government contract breach. Consequently, I expect these firms to be least
represented in ICSID cases. 290 out of the 513 cases either didn’t involve a trade agreement or
didn’t involve a supply chain. 39.18% of cases deal with BITs and supply chains while only
4.29% of cases involve PTAs and supply chains. The mean of the interaction between trade
agreements and supply chains is 0.48, falling between no trade agreements/no supply chain (0)
and a supply chain with a BIT (1). When running a lincom test for a mean at the value of 2
(representing cases with PTAs and supply chains), the p-value is 0.000, denoting that the
probability of this interaction variable representing the mean in this sample is highly unlikely. In
other words, the mean from this sample of data and the assumption that the PTA*Supply Chain
variable is the mean are statistically different. Unfortunately, due to the aforementioned
measurement issues with the dependent variable (host government contract breach), I cannot do
much more with the dependent variable of breach of contract.
[Insert Figure 8 here]
I move on to study what factors promote the likelihood of investors winning cases, as
their arbitration claims are more legitimate in the event of winning a case. A caveat (discussed at
more length in the limitations section) to these analyses is that I can only measure cases that have
been brought to the ICSID. I do not have access to the universe of all breached contracts; instead,
only cases where a firm has decided to litigate a host country through an international court in
the event of a breach of contract. Furthermore, there are cases where the host government wins,
signifying that a contract might not have been broken in the first place. Consequently, I assess
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the relationship between these variables and a different dependent variable (winner of an
investor-state dispute) in the following section.

Protecting Assets in the Event of Breach of Contract
Below is a detailed analysis of the results from the four models of probit testing.
The strength and significance of the second hypothesis is assessed as well as the conventional
knowledge and theory from FDI literature. Results from these models can be found in Table 3.
The analysis is broken down by model for organizational purposes.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Model 1 is the most basic application of my second hypothesis. It tests the affect my
interaction variable has on the likelihood of an investor winning an ICSID case alone. Without
controlling for firm level or state level variables, the interaction of membership in a PTA and
supply chain has a positive effect on the dependent variable. My interaction variable increases
the likelihood of an investor winning an ICSID case by 0.485. The supply chain variable
represents the effect of supply chains when PTA is 0. In this model, it has a negative relationship
with investors winning. When supply chains are 0, the effect of PTA’s on investors winning is
negative and significance with a p-value of less than 0.05. Investors involved in a PTA but not a
supply chain are -.738 less likely to win cases. Consequently, the interaction of supply chains
and PTA’s increases the chances of investors winning considerably. While this result is in line
with the predictions of my second hypothesis, the pseudo r-squared is 0.0210, denoting that this
variable alone account for roughly 2.1% of variation in the dependent variable.
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The second model includes firm specific controls: nationality diversity and the
obsolescing bargain. When accounting for these variables, the interaction variable gains a bit of
strength, increasing from 0.485 to 0.610 in this model. The direction of the supply chain changes
from negative to positive and loses some strength. In other words, when accounting for firm
specific controls, the effect of supply chains on investors winning cases is positive across all
values of membership in a PTA. While the PTA maintains its negative direction, it loses its
significance and a bit of strength (having an effect of -0.738 in the first model and 0.547 in the
second). The firm specific controls, on the other hand, are both significant with p-values less
than 0.05 and have negative effects on the investor winning. All else equal, investors are 0.104
less likely to win their cases with every one unit increase of nationality diversity in the host
country. Furthermore, they are 0.492 less likely to win cases when there is an obsolescing
bargain. This model is more efficient than the first as the pseudo r-squared has increased to
0.0628. These three variables account for 6.3% of variation in an investor winning an ICSID
case. There is a substantial drop in cases in this model from 135 to 231.
Model 3 explores the relationship between the dependent variable and my interaction
variable while controlling for host government specific variables. In this model, the direction of
my Supply Chain*PTA variable remains positive while increasing in strength and gaining
significance (from 0.619 in the second model to 0.989 in the third). Its p-value is less than 0.10.
The effect of supply chains when PTA is 0 switches back to negative at -0.166. The effect of
PTA’s when supply chain is 0 remains negative, but marginally gains strength in this model at
0.569. For everyone million dollar increase in GDP of the host country, investors are 0.261 less
likely to win their cases in the ICSID. The effects of percent GDP FDI are also negative, but
weaker: for every one unit increase in percent GDP from FDI, investors are 0.0383 less likely to
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win their cases. Democracy has a positive effect on investors winning at 0.0202. This model has
a slightly larger pseudo r-squared 0.0643, denoting a marginal increase in explanation of
variation of the dependent variable. The n group of this model increases from 135 in the second
model to 165.
The fourth model tests my interaction terms with both firm specific and host country
specific controls. The interaction variable maintains its significance and increase strength in this
model at 1.250. All else equal, investors involved in supply chains and PTA’s are 1.250 more
likely to win cases in the ICSID. When no PTA’s are involved, cases with supply chains are
0.0723 more likely to win cases. Conversely, when no supply chains are involved, cases with
PTA’s are 0.367 less likely to have investors win. The effect of GDP remains negative and
decrease in strength marginally from -0.261 to -0.244. The effect of percent GDP FDI increases
in strength slightly from -0.0383 to -0.0458. Democracy maintains its positive direction, but
decreases in strength from 0.0202 to 0.0048. The firms specific variables, nationality diversity
and obsolescing bargain, both lose their significance and strength in this model, but maintain
their negative effect on the outcome of investors winning cases. This model has the highest
explanatory power out of the four with a pseudo r-squared of 0.140. Consequently, these
variables account for 14% of variation in the dependent variable. With the results from my probit
analysis, I cannot accept the null hypothesis that the interaction between supply chains and
PTA’s has no effect on investors winning cases in the ICSID. This model has the highest drop in
cases with an n-group of 104. A discussion and explanation of the variation in case numbers can
be found in the limitations section.
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Figure 6.Frequency of ICSID Cases by Trade Agreements
Data Source: ICSID, 2018
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Figure 7. Frequency of ICSID Cases by Supply Chain
Data Source: ICSID, 2018
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Figure 8. Frequency of ICSID Cases by Interaction of Trade Agreements and Supply Chain
Data Source: ICSID, 2018
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Table 3. Likelihood of an Investor Winning ICSID Case

Investor Wins

(1)
Model 1

(2)
Model 2

(3)
Model 3

(4)
Model 4

Supply Chain*PTA

0.485

0.610

0.989*

1.250*

(0.430)
-0.192
(0.186)
-0.738**
(0.335)

(0.503)
0.0168
(0.281)
-0.547
(0.385)

(0.555)
-0.166
(0.224)
-0.569
(0.439)
-0.261
(0.175)
-0.0383
(0.0276)
0.0202
(0.0316)

Nationality Diversity

-0.104**

(0.686)
0.0723
(0.322)
-0.367
(0.540)
-0.244
(0.150)
-0.0458
(0.0602)
0.00477
(0.0517)
-0.0876

Obsolescing Bargain

(0.0486)
-0.492**

(0.0693)
-0.318

Supply Chain
PTA
GDP US millions
% GDP FDI
Democracy

Constant

0.105
(0.128)

(0.250)
0.443
(0.286)

0.0930
(0.265)

(0.303)
0.409
(0.414)

Observations
231
135
165
104
Pseudo R2
0.0210
0.0628
0.0643
0.140
Log Lik
-156.3
-85.15
-106
-60.01
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Data Sources: ICSID, 2018; World Bank, 2018; OECD, 2009; Polity IV, 2018
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Limitations
There are several limitations to measuring the relationship between breach of contract
and supply chains. The most prominent limitation to my research involved measurement validity.
There is no database of breaches of contract to access in aptly measuring the dependent variable.
Likewise, I cannot draw on a comprehensive list of supply chains to employ either.
To address this challenge, I use cases from the ICSID. The ICSID has a database of each
case including variables pertaining to my research like industry type and instruments invoked. In
measuring my first hypothesis, I use mean comparison analysis to determine how significant
cases involving my interaction variable were not the mean. While my findings supported the first
hypothesis, I cannot ignore that there is a selection bias of only choosing cases that go to the
ICSID. In the universe of contract breaches in FDI, not all firms decide to arbitrate the host
country responsible. There may be something specific to cases that go to the ICSID that I am
missing. Consequently, I cannot reject the notion that there could be a spurious relationship
between my dependent variable and interaction variable that I am unaware of in both hypotheses.
With this lack of confidence, I cannot proclaim that my hypotheses were supported by my
evidence, even with statistical significance. My analysis of the relationship between contract
breach and the interaction of membership in supply chains and PTAs is lacking some validity
due to these issues.
Similar constraints taint the validity of my supply chain variable. As there is no list of all
past and present supply chains involved with the ICSID, I build upon theoretical assumptions to
code a supply chain variable. These assumptions include coding for industry types that deal with
intermediate goods, like oil and gas that requires several firms for extraction and refinement. The
coding for this variable is not perfect, but it is the best alternative explored thus far. I have
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consulted with professors of economics, international anti-bribery business organizations,
librarians, economic affair officers from the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), and research centers for supply chain management. All have
concluded that they are either unaware of any list of international supply chains or that it simply
does not exist. In the future, finding a better way to code this variable would add significant
validity to this research.
These measurement validity issues with my dependent variable and supply chain variable
pose a serious challenge to my research. I cannot claim with complete certainty that the
interaction between supply chains and PTAs have a significant effect on contract breach in FDI.
There is substantial variation in the number of cases for each model. Model 1 has the
highest number of cases at 231 while the model 4 has the lowest at 104. I attribute this to the
difficulty of having cases with data points at each value of each control. As I add control
variables, I use different data sources that have some variation in data availably per case year.
Model 1 has the highest number of cases (231) because its only source is the ICSID. Model 2
drops in cases slightly as I add in data from the OECD. Unfortunately, the OECD does not have
available data for every country per case year. Model 3 has 165 cases; for every case year
provided by ICSID, the World Bank had data points for 165 of those cases. When combining all
three sources (ICSID, OECD, and World Bank), data points were available across the board for
only 104 cases.
I also attribute limited availability of data to the nature of these cases. Table 4 in the
appendix shows the break down of cases by country. The majority of cases deal with developing
host countries, where data collection can be difficult and limited. Consequently, a significant
amount of cases are dropped using three different data sources involving developing countries.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS

Influx in FDI offers LDCs their best shot at development. It is the largest, most stable
form of external financing that these countries receive. Furthermore, it offers job growth,
technological development, and innovation to host countries. Risk of contract breach poses a
huge barrier to FDI as investors seek to minimize their losses. This risk is substantiated by the
increase in caseload by the ICSID each year. The puzzle, then, is to find a way for MNCs to be
more certain about the outcome of their investments, all else equal.
FDI literature asses several variables and their effect on host government contract breach.
They approach this relationship from either the perspective of the firm or the host country. Host
country specific variables include factors like trade agreements signed, nationality diversity of
investors, GDP, and democracy level. Firm specific variables involve industry type, which
indicates the obsolescing bargain and supply chain variables alike. I take a new approach and
look at the interaction of firm specific and host country specific variables. The host country
specific variable I find most effective in my analysis is membership in a PTA. PTA’s involve
making commitments with several countries. Consequently, breaking multilateral promises
threaten the credibility of commitments in future international relations. On the firm specific
side, membership in supply chain threatens litigation and losses from all links in the chain the
event of a contract breach. Therefore, looking at the interaction of membership in supply chains
and PTA’s assess the strength of credibility a host country makes to the parties of the PTA and
links in the supply chain. As the old adage goes, there is strength in numbers.
To assess the claims of my theory, I propose two hypotheses:
H1: Host governments are less likely to break a contract with foreign firms involved in
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PTAs and supply chains than firms involved in just PTAs, just supply chains, or neither.
H2: In the event of a contract breach, firms that are involved in supply chains and trade
agreements protect their assets more efficiently than those otherwise.
Using the data from the ICSID, World Bank, and OECD, I use quantitative methods to
test my hypotheses. My conclusions on the test of each hypothesis can be found below.

Preventing Breach of Contract
The best test of my theory involves prevention of contract breach. If the interaction of
supply chains and PTA’s are strong enough to deter contract breach, then MNCs will feel more
inclined to invest in FDI under these conditions. However, I encounter some measurement issues
that threaten the validity of my tests. The main obstacle to measuring the effectiveness of my
interaction variable against preventing contract breach is that contract breach is nearly
impossible to measure.
To date, there is no database that contains a universe of all breaches of contract in FDI. I
can only draw samples of contract breach from cases that have been formally filed through
international dispute settlement courts. Consequently, I am missing all cases of contract breach
that have not been formally filed. There could be something specific to cases that are formally
filed that is skewing the outcome of my studies. To add more validity to this study in the future,
it may be prudent to include some qualitative methods like interviews with representatives from
MNCs sharing their experience in FDI. I will discuss this idea in towards the end of my
conclusion.

54

Despite measurement validity issues, I ran mean comparison analysis tests on my sample
of cases from the ICSID. When controlling for trade agreements (PTA’s, BIT’s, or none), I
found that the mean significantly indicates that cases involving BIT’s are most prevalent in the
sample of ICSID cases. This could signify that BIT’s are perhaps not effective in preventing
contract breach, or that perhaps they are most often used as an instrument to sue host
governments in the case of a contract breach. When controlling for cases involving supply chains
and cases not involving supply chains, I found that the mean significantly denotes cases
involving supply chains as most prevalent in the sample of ICSID cases. This result is not
shocking as all links in a supply chain can threaten litigation in the event of a contract breach.
Finally, when controlling for the interaction between supply chains and BIT’s, the
interaction between supply chains and PTA’s, and neither, I find that cases with no interaction
were significantly the most prevalent. I ran a test to see if there was any possibility that cases
with supply chains and PTA’s could be the mean, and it was statistically insignificant. With the
measurement validity issue in mind, I do not have enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis
that there is no relationship between the interaction of supply chains and PTA’s and prevention
of contract breach. However, I can say that they are significantly the least prevalent type of case
from ICSID cases.

Protecting Assets in the Event of Breach of Contract
The data I have lends itself more to analyzing determents of contract breaches that have
already occurred. I propose that the interaction of membership in supply chains and PTA’s not
only helps prevent contract breach in the first place, but also helps cause investors to win in their
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cases. Knowing that they have a legal foot to stand on in the ICSID, MNCs would be more
inclined to take a second look at risky investments in FDI. From my sample of ICSID cases, I
coded cases where the investor wins as my dependent variable. I run several models, assessing
variables from the literature and my theory alike to test their strength in determining the outcome
of an ICSID case.
In the most basic test of my hypothesis, where I ran my interaction terms against the
dependent variable, there was a positive, insignificant with my interaction variable. Furthermore,
the effect of PTA’s when there is no supply chain involved is actually significant and negative,
denoting that membership in a PTA alone decreases the likelihood of investors winning cases.
With no controls, the interaction between membership in a supply chain and PTA have an
insignificantly positive effect on the outcome of an investor winning an ICSID case. The
findings of the first model does not support my hypothesis as the effect of the interaction variable
is not significant.
When controlling for the firm specific variables, the controls themselves take on
significance. The nationality diversity and the obsolescing bargain both had a significantly
negative relationship with the event of an investor winning an ICSID case. The more diversity of
nationalities investing in a host government the less likely an investor is to win an ICSID case.
Likewise, if the firm involved in a case is in an industry with an obsolescing bargain, the investor
is less likely to win an ICSID case. Furthermore, my interaction remains positive, yet still
insignificant, increasing in strength marginally. These findings establish further confidence in
the existing literature on FDI, but do not support my theory. Controlling for host government
specific variables and my interaction variable yields no significant results. The direction of my
interaction variable remains positive and increases in strength, however.
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The third model involves host country specific variables. The interaction variable took on
significance in this model and increased strength. Furthermore, the supply chain and PTA
variable had a negative effect on the dependent variable, denoting that the there is something
special between the interaction of the two that creates a positive likelihood of investors winning
cases. The GDP related variables have a negative effect on dependent variable while democracy
score has a positive one. The pseudo r-squared of this model is stronger than the first and second.
In the final model, I include both firm specific and host government specific variables. In
this model, my interaction variable is the strongest. Its relationship with the event of an investor
wining an ICSID case is significant while all other controls lose significance. Furthermore, the
pseudo r squared for this model is the strongest, denoting the most explanatory power out of
models. I cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the interaction of
membership in supply chains and preferential trade agreements and investors winning ICSID
cases. While investors certainly do not hope for an outcome of perusing litigation in FDI, it helps
to know what scenarios are safest for investment. Knowing that being part of a supply chain and
investing in a country that is involved in a PTA is correlated with winning an ICSID case in the
event of a contract breach removes uncertainty and risk.

Future Research and Alternate Methods
The findings of my research are not conclusive. In addressing my first hypothesis, I could
not go far beyond mean comparison analysis and frequency studies. My findings tout that a
significant minority of cases filed through the ICSID involve the interaction of supply chains and
PTA’s. I cannot say with certainty that this is the case for all iterations of host government
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contract breach. In the future, qualitative case studies of MNC’s from a variety of industries and
home governments could add validity to my findings. Johns and Wellhausen have used this
method to interview various firms who experienced contract breach while investing in riskier
host countries. They found that supply chains are deterrent to contract breach (Johns and
Wellhausen, 2016). I think that conducting similar research while focusing on the interaction of
supply chains and PTA’s could yield some interesting results. Furthermore, I think that doing
some content analysis of PTA’s and seeing which terms are most effective at preventing breach
would be useful for investors moving forward.
While I have found a significant correlation between membership in supply chains and
PTA’s on investors winning ICSID cases, I cannot draw any certain conclusions about contract
breach in general. Because my analysis is drawn from a sample of cases of contract breach filed
through the ICSID, my results tell more about the ICSID process than contract breach itself.
However, I have not yet found a method to aptly quantitatively measure contract breach. As I do
not see a possibility of obtaining a database of the universe of contract breaches in the future,
case studies could much to explain iterations of contract breach that have not been reported
through international courts.
I have learned a lot about the variation in contract breach by analyzing this relationship
through quantitative methods. It was satisfying to see some results in numbers, despite
measurement validity issues. Seeing significance in the relationship between investors winning
their cases and my theory was satisfying. Moving forward, I recommend case studies and
interviews to asses this relationship in the future.
The findings of my analysis are useful for host governments and firms alike. For host
governments, understanding what makes them attractive to FDI offers prospects for more
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investment in the future. For firms, knowing that membership in supply chains and PTA’s (on
the part of the host government) can grant some semblance of certainty in an otherwise risky
endeavor. The knowledge from my findings and what can be obtained from future research helps
grow FDI and subsequently development of LDCs.
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APPENDIX

Links to Data Sources
World Bank World Development Indicators (used for measurement of GDP and % GDP FDI):
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators
OECD (used for nationality diversity):
https://data.oecd.org/fdi/outward-fdi-flows-by-partner-country.htm
(example of similar use from Wellhausen, 2015):
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002713503299
Polity IV (used for democracy rating):
https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html
ICSID (used for all other variables):
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx
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Frequency of Contract Breaches by Country
Table 4. Frequency of Contract Breaches by Country

Host Country
ARG
MEX
CZE
USA
UKR
ECU
EGY
RUS
POL
CAN
KAZ
SVK
TUR
GEO
ROM
VEN
PER
BGD
CAF
CHL
CRI
HUN
MDA
ALB
BGR
DZA
EST
GHA
HRV
JOR
KGZ
LBN
LVA
MYS
PRY
TZA
YEM
ARE
ARM

Cases
20
15
14
11
10
9
9
8
7
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1

Percent
8.66
6.49
6.06
4.76
4.33
3.9
3.9
3.46
3.03
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.16
2.16
2.16
1.73
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
0.87
0.87
0.87
0.87
0.87
0.87
0.87
0.87
0.87
0.87
0.87
0.87
0.87
0.87
0.43
0.43
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AZE
BDI
BFA
BLZ
ESP
FRA
GAB
GRD
GTM
HND
IDN
IND
IRN
KEN
KNA
LAO
LKA
LTU
MAR
MLI
MMR
MNG
PAK
PAN
PHL
SLV
SYC
TGO
THA
TJK
TKM
TTO
TUN
URY
UZB
ZAF
ZWE
Total

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
231

0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
100

Data Source: ICSID, 2018
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